

11-4222/p

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10 JUN 1959

8 JUN 1959

card

Major General Robert A. Brettwieser, USAF  
Director for Intelligence  
The Joint Staff

Dear Bob,

Thank you very much for your letter of 18 May in which you make certain suggestions in connection with the procedure for the release of NIE's to foreign governments. This is a matter which I have had very much in mind and I appreciate your views. Sherman Kent has also received a letter from another member of the IB on this same subject.

I have sent your note down to Sherman and have asked his office to review the various suggestions that have been made in connection with the release of NIE's. The Office of National Estimates is currently working on this project. I hope to have something to place before the IB for its consideration at an early meeting.

Sincerely,

SIGNED

Allen W. Dulles  
Director

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
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(EXECUTIVE)

JCS



27 May 1959

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Criteria Regarding Release of National  
Intelligence Estimates to Foreign Governments

1. This memorandum contains our recommendations regarding General Breitweiser's letter to you of 18 May (attached) which (a) suggested that USIB members appeared to be using "slightly different yardsticks" in assessing the question of release of NIE's and (b) recommended that the Security Committee of USIB -- "or other appropriate mechanism" -- be asked to examine the matter. A personal letter which I have received from General Samford dealing with this same problem is also attached. General Samford has suggested various criteria which might be applied in considering release.

2. We disagree with General Breitweiser's suggestion that the Security Committee consider the problem of releasing NIE's to friendly foreign governments. The difficulties involved are those of policy and judgment rather than security per se. Although the USIB occasionally must deal with the problem of security in connection with the release of US intelligence materials, [redacted] security questions regarding individual estimates are normally dealt with at the ONE staff level. Problems arise at the USIB level over whether release of a given estimate would be desirable or not. The recent case of the [redacted] which both General Breitweiser and General Samford cite is an example of this.

3. We therefore recommend that the Board of National Estimates, which normally prepares the memoranda on release



**NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY**  
**FT. GEORGE G. MEADE, MD.**

6 May 1959

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Mr. Sherman Kent  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Sherm:

The discussion yesterday on release of NIE 22-59 appeared to be a discussion of feelings rather than reasons. I wonder if it would be helpful to establish a check list for future discussions. Such a check list might consist of a set of general reasons for not releasing intelligence and a set of general reasons for releasing it.

I suggest the following as being general reasons for not releasing intelligence, either fact or estimate:

First - Release could stimulate action to frustrate our intelligence activities either generally or discretely.

Second - Release could make it possible for some power to frustrate action responsive to the intelligence.

Third - We are ashamed of the quality of the intelligence being considered for release.

Fourth - We would be embarrassed directly in future associations to have our frank views known, or our activities known.

I would suggest the following as being general reasons for releasing intelligence:


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First - Release could stimulate action to aid our intelligence activities, possibly through supply of additional information or access.

Second - Release could make it easier to pursue "combined" action or defend "unilateral" action responsive to the intelligence.



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
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It is probable that some "combined" actions or some "unilateral" U.S. actions responsive to the intelligence might be easier to pursue.

The release would further emphasize our policy of intelligence cooperation.

There is no concern about face to face frankness with the subject country in this instance.

A recap of the check gives two possible disadvantages, both only remotely possible, and three advantages one of which is considered probable.



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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script.


JOHN A. SAMFORD  
Lieutenant General, USAF  
Director

for USIB consideration, be authorized to prepare a study for early submission to you and subsequent consideration by the USIB.

4. The proposed study would consider the following questions:

a. What criteria should be employed in determining release or non-release of NIE's to foreign governments?

b. To what extent should the DCI and USIB formalize their procedures for considering release and what specific actions would be required to carry this finding out?

  
SHERMAN KENT  
Assistant Director  
National Estimates

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